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SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Many of the decisions reported this past year concern procedural
problems.
Warren Sanitary Milk Co. v. Board of Review' involved an interest-
ing question as to when an employer is entitled to notice of an appeal on
a claim for unemployment benefits. Due to a strike six claimants ap-
plied for unemployment compensation for the week ending December
26, 1959. The application for determination of benefit rights was al-
lowed on January 13, 1960, but the claim itself was disallowed on the
basis that the unemployment was due to a labor dispute then in progress.
There was no application for reconsideration of this determination, but
the claimants continued to file claims for benefits at weekly intervals
which were disallowed on the basis that the labor dispute had continued
through February 19, 1960. On March 3, however, the claimants filed
a request for reconsideration of the subsequent claims, and the adminis-
trator affirmed his earlier determination that the claimants were disquali-
fied. On March 21 they filed notice of appeal and a hearing was there-
after scheduled before a referee of the Board of Review, Bureau of Unem-
ployment Compensation, on May 2, 1960.
The employer was notified of the determinations of the administra-
tor, with the possible exception of the decision on reconsideration, but he
received no notice of the referee's hearing. The referee found that the
claimants were not disqualified under the facts and reversed the adminis-
trator's redetermination. The first the employer learned of this action
was through his next monthly notice of benefits charged to his account
in accordance with the experience rating provisions of the Ohio law.'
When the employer filed exceptions to the charge to his account, he
was furnished with a copy of the referee's ruling, from which he then
sought to institute further appeal. The Board of Review, however, ruled
that the employer was not an "interested party" within the meaning of
the act and, therefore, not entitled to notice or to institute further appeal.
The term "interested party," with respect to the determination of any
"claim for benefits," is defined to mean the claimant and the administra-
tor, but if such determination is with respect to the "first claim" for bene-
fits or an "additional claim," then it also includes the claimant's most
recent employer.'
The Board of Review took the position that "first claim" meant the
first claim to arise, and since the claimants had failed to apply for recon-
1. 179 N.E.2d 385 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
2. OHIo REV. CODE § 4141.24 (Supp. 1962).
3. OHIo REv. CODE § 4141.01(1) (Supp. 1962).
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sideration of their initial claim for the week ending December 26, the
referee's ruling had no application. The court took the position, how-
ever, that this interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional4
and held that by the elimination of other choices, on constitutional
grounds, or those of administrative complexity, or both, the term "first
claim" meant the first claim actually allowed by determination within
the structure of the unemployment compensation administration, includ-
ing the Board of Review. If this construction be considered strained,
the court said, it was the only construction that would save constitution-
ality.
The court then ruled that the refusal of the Board of Review to re-
ceive and act upon the employer's application to institute further appeal
was unreasonable and unlawful. The cause was remanded to the board
with direction to vacate any and all findings and decisions based upon the
report of its referee and to proceed to hear the merits of the claimants'
appeals from the decision of the administrator on reconsideration, afford-
ing notice of hearing and full opportunity to participate to the employer-
appellant.
With reference to the court's order in the foregoing case, the decision
of the court of appeals in Winski v. Board of Review5 should be of in-
terest. In this case the claimant contended that he had deposited a letter
addressed to the Board of Review in the mailbox in front of the post
office in Yorkville on January 18, 1960. The letter was received by the
board in due course but was postmarked January 19, 1960, at 7 a.m.,
twenty-four hours beyond the ten-day statutory limit for filing notice of
appeal.6 The Board of Review dismissed the appeal as being untimely,
but the common pleas court remanded the cause to the board for further
consideration as to whether notice of appeal was timely filed.
The court of appeals pointed out that the Unemployment Compensation
Act provides what decision a common pleas court may make in such in-
stances, i.e., the court is limited to affirming, reversing, or modifying the
board and nothing more. Since there is nothing in the statute authoriz-
4. Amicus curiae had argued that the employer could challenge his liability to a higher con-
tribution rate under § 4141.26 and be afforded a hearing on this challenge. On this point,
however, the court said: "Human nature and the desire for consistency being what it is,
the Court cannot conceive of even an administrative agency which would not desire, for the
record, to have the two determinations consistent with each other. Thus the employer, in the
second hearing, confronts a tribunal which has, in fact, prejudged the ultimate fact in issue,
and is thus predisposed to disallow his contention. This is not a fair hearing by any standard
of due process.... And since it is not a fair hearing it is not the adequate substitute for notice
and opportunity to be heard in the first proceeding, as claimed. Therefore any interpretation
of R.C. § 4141.28 (D & J) which deprives the employer of notice and opportunity to be heard
on the employee's claim for benefits would render the act unconstitutional." Warren Sanitary
Milk Co. v. Board of Review, 179 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
5. 179 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
6. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.28(G) (Supp. 1962).
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ing a court to remand a case for further consideration, the court's attempt
to do so was dearly reversible error. It was also pointed out that if the
appeal to the board was beyond the statutory limit, the board had no juris-
diction and neither did the court of common pleas.
In United Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Tichenor7 the Board of Review had
found that the employee claiming benefits was entitled to them. The em-
ployer appealed to the common pleas court and the decision of the board
was affirmed on April 22, 1959. On May 1 the employer filed a motion
for a rehearing and reconsideration of the court's decision. On October
10 the administrator filed a motion in opposition and on October 28 a
journal entry was filed again affirming the decision of the Board of Re-
view without reference to either the employer's motion or the adminis-
trator's motion in opposition. The employer then filed a notice of appeal
on November 12, 1959.
The court held that the filing of the notice of appeal within the
twenty-day period prescribed by section 2505.07 of the Ohio Revised
Code is jurisdictional. The filing of a motion for rehearing and recon-
sideration, the equivalent of a motion for a new trial, it was ruled, will
not extend the time within which an appeal can be perfected. The entry
of April 22, 1959, the court said, was a final order which had never been
vacated and, therefore, was unaffected by the subsequent similar entry of
October 28. The filing of the latter did not extend the time for appeal
from the earlier judgment.
In Dewine v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation it was held
that a notice of appeal to the common pleas court, stating that the deci-
sion of the Board of Review was unlawful, unreasonable, and against the
weight of the evidence, did not set forth the decision appealed from and
the errors complained of, and was, therefore, insufficient under the terms
of section 4141.28 of the Ohio Revised Code.
With reference to the 1959 amendments, it was held in Howell v.
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation that the appeal provisions of
the amended statute were not applicable to a claim for unemployment
benefits filed before the effective date of the amendment. The court
further held that the provisions of the statute prior to amendment were
applicable to an appeal to a common pleas court from a decision on a
7. 178 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
8. 178 N.E.2d 260 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
9. 115 Ohio App. 506, 185 N.E.2d 765 (1961). As a result, the old provision, so often
stumbled over, that appeal to the common pleas court could only be made from a decision of
the Board of Review on rehearing, was applicable. Thus, it was held that an appeal could not
be taken from an order of the board disallowing the claimant's application to institute further
appeal. For a discussion of cases arising under the former provision, see Teple, Survey of
Ohio Law - Social Security and Public Welfare, 11 W. Ras. L. REv. 420, 425-26 (1960).
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claim for benefits filed during the time such prior statute was still in
effect.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The decisions on substantive issues were no less interesting.
In Albaugh v. Alsco, Inc.'° the court held that the payment on De-
cember 15 of a bonus to employees who were laid off at the time was
not compensation for services rendered during the week of payment and,
thus, did not affect the eligibility of persons otherwise entitled to unem-
ployment benefits for that week. The payment was made under a pro-
vision of a collective bargaining agreement providing for the accumula-
tion of two cents for each hour worked to be paid as a Christmas bonus
between December 1 and December 15. The court made appropriate
reference to the provision in section 4141.46, too often overlooked, that
the Unemployment Compensation Act is to be liberally construed.
Another case1 in which the right to benefits was upheld, although
the claim had been denied by the administrator and his determination had
been affirmed by a common pleas court, involved an interesting determi-
nation of fact. The claimant had been discharged for allegedly returning
to the plant from lunch in an intoxicated condition. The court of ap-
peals held that the provision in a collective bargaining agreement which
permitted discharge for reporting to work in an intoxicated condition
was applicable to an employee returning from lunch. But where, upon a
hearing before the referee, the employee denied the charge of intoxica-
tion, and where there was credible and overwhelming evidence that the
employee was not intoxicated, the court held it to be reversible error for
the Board of Review as well as the common pleas court to set aside the
determination of the referee allowing the claim for benefits.
In its opinion the court stressed the fact that in over twenty-two pages
of the record the company witness had nowhere testified that the claimant
was drunk or intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. Although
the foreman thought the claimant had staggered as he turned toward the
clock, stepping out around a table, he also said that a normal person
might have been unsteady turning the same corner. Although there was
some evidence of improper conduct in other respects, the court also
held that the existence of grounds upon which the employee might have
been discharged is immaterial if such grounds were not in fact the basis
for the discharge action taken.
There was also an important decision'" involving the application of
the labor dispute disqualification. The claimants were laid off at the
10. 179 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
11. Hawkins v. Leach, 115 Ohio App. 259, 185 N.E.2d 36 (1961).
12. Baumgarte v. Board of Review, 186 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio C.P. 1961). The court dis-
[VoL 14:3
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
Delphos plant of the Fruehauf Trailer Company. According to them, the
layoff was due to a shortage of steel at the Delphos plant occasioned by
the steel strike of 1959. The referee, however, found that the layoff was
the result of a labor dispute at the company's Avon Lake plant, ap-
proximately 180 miles away, and on the basis that these two plants con-
stituted the same "establishment," disqualified the claimants. This find-
ing was affirmed by the Board of Review.
The court held that these determinations were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. It was pointed out that the record was replete
with testimony which the referee seemed to completely ignore, that the
layoff was due to the shortage of steel. However, the court also found
that only twenty per cent of the production at the Delphos plant could
possibly be affected by the work stoppage at the Avon Lake plant, and
that any employees so affected could have been utilized on other produc-
tion lines at the Delphos plant. On the basis of this evidence, as well as
the distance separating the two plants, the court held that they did not
constitute the same "establishment." This is a heartening indication that
a more realistic approach to the "establishment" test may yet be adopted
by the Ohio courts.
In Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc. v. Constance"3 the employer found
that it was suffering serious inventory shortages. Thefts by employees
were suspected and, after numerous efforts to reduce the shortages, the
employer finally insisted that all employees take lie detector tests. Forty-
four employees refused and either quit or were fired. The Board of Re-
view found that the resignations were forced and held that these separa-
tions as a result of the refusal of the claimants to take lie detector tests
were not for good cause within the meaning of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act. This decision allowing benefits was reversed by the com-
mon pleas court. The court of appeals upheld the board, reversing the
lower court, on the basis that the board might reasonably have decided
either way and that on such close questions, the courts have no authority
to upset the board's decision.'4
tinguished the decisions in McGee v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 161 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956), and Adamski v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 108 Ohio App. 198,
161 NXE.2d 907 (1959), on the basis of the difference in the facts in those two cases. For an
earlier discussion of this subject and the decisions referred to, see Teple, Survey of Ohio Law -
Social Security and Public Welfare, 11 W. REs. L REv. 420 (1960).
13. 115 Ohio App. 437, 185 NXE.2d 655 (1961).
14. In its opinion the court pointed out that the Board of Review had decided there was not
just cause for firing an employee who refused to take his chances on a machine which had
not been proved accurate enough for court use and from which the courts universally protect
the worst and most hardened criminal. One judge dissented, feeling that the employees who
refused to comply with uniformly applied and reasonable conditions of continued employ-
ment and who chose to quit rather than comply, or be discharged by reason of their non-
compliance, were ineligible for benefits.
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